



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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Arms Control

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Arms Control

-From the early days of his term in office, *Gorbachev has made arms control talks one of the centerpieces of his foreign policy.* Like his predecessors, Gorbachev's objectives include reducing the threat from the West, moving the arms competition into areas more favorable to the USSR, and boosting Soviet political prestige:

- The INF agreement eliminated the Pershing II, and Soviet START positions are designed to constrain US cruise missiles while preserving Soviet deployments of mobile missiles and new heavy ICBMs.
- Forestalling SDI is the central aim of Soviet efforts in the Defense and Space Talks.
- In the negotiations on conventional arms the Soviets hope to reduce what they see as NATO advantages in tactical aircraft and naval force.

Beyond these enduring objectives, however, lies an approach to international security driven in large measure by domestic economic imperatives. Gorbachev inherited a foundering economy which he characterized as having reached a 'precrisis' stage. He has made economic revitalization his highest priority and has embraced the arms control process as the best means of managing military competition with the US without undercutting his economic agenda:

- Agreements to sharply cut the strategic forces of both sides would reduce the future cost of modernizing the Soviet strategic arsenal by limiting the number of systems that would have to be upgraded.
- An enduring ban on the deployment of space-based defenses—which the Soviets have consistently linked to reductions in offensive forces—would allow the Soviets to forgo an enormously expensive response to SDI.
- Reductions in conventional forces would provide direct savings and free increasingly scarce manpower for civilian industry.

For further information on the arms control issues, contact Staff.

A strategic arms control package concluded within the next year could still shape defense priorities in the 1991-95 Five-Year Defense Plan, the first one to be formulated under Gorbachev's leadership.

Gorbachev and his political supporters have cast their arms control proposals in the context of "new thinking," a framework for Soviet foreign policy that emphasizes the contribution that political strategy—as opposed to purely military factors—can make to the USSR's security. *Gorbachev's strategy is intended to alter the "enemy image" of the USSR in the West, exacerbate tensions between the US and its European allies, and undercut Western public support for arms modernization.*

Some in Moscow have clearly been uneasy with what they see as Gorbachev's overly concessionary arms control tactics, and many top military officials are concerned not to rush into ambitious new agreements before the implications can be fully evaluated. *Even foreign policy conservatives, however, generally support arms control as a means of obtaining a "breathing space" from military competition with the West, in order to concentrate on the industrial modernization needed to meet the military challenge of the 1990s and beyond.*

And this fall's leadership changes have clearly strengthened Gorbachev's hand in pursuing a new approach to the long-term relationship between East and West. All except one of the Brezhnev holdovers have now been removed from the Politburo. While the two most powerful defenders of ideological orthodoxy in foreign policy—Ligachev and Chebrikov—remain in important positions, they have been moved to accounts that will involve them less directly in foreign affairs. *On INF and START, Gorbachev has already shown a penchant for the bold move and, to the extent he sees additional opportunities, he may now have more latitude to make sweeping proposals and dramatic initiatives.*

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Nonetheless, while Gorbachev remains a "man in a hurry," in the near term *he apparently does not feel the need to make dramatic unilateral concessions* on such core issues as the Soviet insistence on the linkage between a START agreement and nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty or the US demand that the Krasnoyarsk radar be dismantled:

- Moscow is convinced that a new administration in Washington will build on the strategic arms control framework already in place.
- To maintain momentum during the transition, the Soviets are moving aggressively to eliminate outstanding verification problems.

There is, however, a real prospect Gorbachev will attempt some dramatic gesture in Europe, such as a unilateral reduction of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe.

A unilateral reduction of troops on a scale [] would leave the overall military balance largely unchanged, but which would seriously complicate NATO's decisionmaking on issues like force structure and modernization. At the same time, the Soviets also would hope to generate enthusiasm among West European leaders to move forward on future conventional arms control negotiations, which are still in the planning stages.

US-Soviet Arms Control Talks

Geneva

Nuclear and Space Talks (NST)—Bilateral
Ambassador Max Kampelman
Round X—July 1988

Group on Strategic Offensive Arms (START)—
Seeks limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers, and cruise missiles
Ambassador Read Hanmer

Group on Defense and Space (D&S)—Seeks to
substitute the proposed D&S treaty for the existing ABM Treaty of 1972
Ambassador Henry Cooper

Conference on Disarmament (CD)—Multilateral
Ambassador Max Freidersdorf
Chemical Weapons Intersessional—tentative session,
December 1988
Summer Session—July-September—Seeks total ban
on chemical weapons

Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT)—Bilateral
Ambassador Paul Robinson
Round III began on 29 August 1988; negotiate verification improvements to TTBT and PNET

Chemical Weapons Treaty Talks—Bilateral
Ambassador Max Freidersdorf
Round IX—July-August 1988—Outgrowth of chemical weapons negotiations in CD

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)—
Bilateral

Commissioner, Richard M. Ellis
SCC XXXV: Spring 1988—Discuss and resolve compliance concerns with ABM Treaty

ABM Treaty Review was conducted in August 1988; meeting of fall SCC Session pending.

Vienna

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—Multilateral

Ambassador Warren Zimmerman
Fourth round: In recess—will resume sometime in fall—open ended
Create confidence-building steps to reduce risk of accidental war

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)—
Multilateral
Ambassador Steven Ledogar
Round 46: 30 September through 1 December 1988
Seeks to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact troop levels

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Heads of Soviet Arms Control Delegations

Geneva

NST: Aleksey Obukhov, 50, has START and SALT experience

START Group: Lem Masterkov, 59, also has been involved since SALT.

D&S Group: Yuriy Kuznetsov, 60, is a Southeast Asia specialist who has been involved in arms control issues since 1985.

CD: Yuriy Nazarkin, 56, is a 21-year veteran of CD and its predecessors.

NTT: Igor' Palenikh, 59, has extensive experience in nuclear and disarmament issues.

CW: Yuriy Nazarkin (see above)

SCC: Maj. Gen. Vladimir Kuklev, 52, has 15 years' experience in negotiations (SALT II, START, INF).

Vienna


CSCE: Yuriy Kashlev, 54, is a media specialist who has participated in CSCE since 1974

MBFR: Valentin Mikhaylov, 62, is an old-style Soviet diplomat

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Soviet and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces Within the Atlantic-to-Urals Zone



Country	Ground forces (divisions)	Air Force/Air Defense forces (regiments)	Country	Ground forces (divisions)	Air Force/Air Defense forces (regiments)
East Germany			Bulgaria		
Soviet	20	10	Bulgarian	8	10
East German	6	10	Soviet Union (military divisions)		
Poland			Baltic	13	14
Soviet	2	8	Belorussian	16	20
Polish	13	24	Carpathian	18	17
Czechoslovakia			Leningrad	13	17
Soviet	6	2	Kiev	18	22
Czech	11	14	Odessa	12	9
Hungary			Moscow	13	26
Soviet	4	6	Ural	7	3
Hungarian	-	3	Volga	6	8
Romania			North Caucasus	10	18
Romanian	10	0	Transcaucasus	14	13

* Includes tank, motorized rifle, airborne, artillery, and air defense divisions.
 * The Hungarian Ground Forces are now organized into three corps, with the 1st being the largest mechanized unit.

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Soviet Objectives and Options in Conventional Arms Control

Moscow has a number of interrelated motives both for engaging the West in conventional arms control negotiations and for reducing Soviet military forces:

- The Warsaw Pact has *genuine concern about NATO's ability to continue producing advanced-technology nonnuclear weapons* and to mobilize and reinforce military forces. It is particularly concerned about the capability of NATO's air forces.
- Arms talks offer Moscow *another forum in which to demonstrate its "peaceful" intent, to sow dissension among NATO Allies*, and to erode political support in Western Europe for NATO force modernization programs. Simply by engaging in the negotiating process, the Soviets hope to complicate Alliance decisionmaking and isolate the US on issues that are controversial within the Alliance.
- If the Soviets could *shift investment from the defense to the civilian sector* by reducing military procurement and construction, Gorbachev's long-term economic programs would benefit. Gorbachev would better be able to protect his arms control policies from domestic critics and thus further his economic aims if he could demonstrate that Pact conventional reductions—or increased Western perceptions of a diminishing Soviet threat—discouraged NATO's modernization.

Proposals and Possible Gambits

Moscow has conducted a vigorous public diplomacy campaign on conventional reductions since the Warsaw Pact issued its 1986 Budapest Appeal, which called for mutual NATO-Pact reductions of 500,000 men and their associated equipment. *The campaign now stresses the three-stage outline presented by Gorbachev at the Moscow Summit: identify and eliminate asymmetries, implement large mutual reductions, and restructure forces for defense.*

It suggests, however, that the Pact had not formulated the details of its position by the spring of 1988. Other more recent information, including the East's performance in negotiating a mandate for new conventional arms talks, suggests the continued lack of a detailed proposal.

We believe the Pact will not accept the NATO proposal as it is currently being discussed because the Western Alliance wants to call, in effect, for *massive Pact cuts in return for minor NATO cuts*. Neither the US Government nor NATO has finalized its position on a number of issues related to a NATO proposal. The outline of NATO's proposal, however, is likely to include massive Pact reductions in tanks, artillery, and possibly infantry fighting vehicles to bring Pact forces slightly below current NATO levels. NATO would take only marginal reductions in the initial phase. For example, the Pact would remove about 28,000 of its tanks in return for a reduction of about 900 NATO tanks. As yet unspecified residual ceilings would be applied to selected types of equipment/manpower, and some requirements for placing equipment in monitored storage most likely will be included. Some consideration is being given to developing a proposal that would protect NATO's war reserves and pre-positioned equipment and to other negotiating proposals designed to capture Soviet forces, while allowing NATO to retain as much flexibility as possible.

The Soviets are likely to view such proposals by NATO as failing to meet any of their fundamental concerns. *Moscow has admitted that some numerical asymmetries in Europe favor the Pact*, but has argued that *other factors*—such as the quality of NATO's air power—*compensate for quantitative advantages*. They probably will seek to address these "qualitative" NATO advantages in the negotiations with a proposal designed to:

- Secure the removal of some American forces from Europe.
- Diminish the ability of the West German Bundeswehr to mobilize.
- Include NATO's air forces—particularly its nuclear-capable aircraft—in the negotiations by arguing that the Pact's advantage in tanks is more than offset by NATO's superior air power.

The Soviets and their allies probably would prefer to negotiate mutual force reductions because it is militarily sensible to "trade" reductions. They will gain

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some benefit merely from being engaged in conventional negotiations, but they realize that the tensions within NATO on conventional issues could make it difficult for the Western Alliance to reach an agreement on conventional reductions in the short term. As a result, *the Soviets might favor a unilateral gesture as a gamble to secure some type of reciprocal Western response or to encourage cuts or freezes on Western defense spending. Such a gesture might also be seen as a means of speeding negotiations.* [

] the Soviets have considered at least one unilateral step—the removal of the four Soviet divisions stationed in Hungary. Moscow could also offer a unilateral gesture on short-range nuclear forces. Such a gambit would appeal strongly to West Germany.

Status of Conventional Talks

Currently there are *two sets of formal negotiations* related to conventional arms control under way in Vienna:

- The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, which cover reductions in a central zone of Europe, began in 1973. Several NATO states do not participate and France (a nonparticipant) wants MBFR ended before the new negotiations open.


- The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is a 35-nation review descended from the original Helsinki meeting (1973-75). In addition to discussing performance on human rights and economic cooperation, it is considering a follow-on to the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), which produced the Stockholm Agreement of 1986 on confidence building measures (CBMs). The US has maintained that neither new arms reduction talks nor new CBM negotiations can open until the CSCE review is complete. The West has insisted that the East show some progress on human rights before the CSCE review concludes.

In addition, *informal talks to prepare a mandate for future negotiations on conventional reductions* began in early 1987 and include all NATO and Pact states. Although the mandate could be completed before the end of this year, several unresolved issues still remain contentious within NATO or between NATO and the Pact, including:

- The geographic zone to be covered by the new talks, particularly what portions of Turkey and the western USSR are included.
- The scope of the negotiations, that is, whether dual-capable systems are included.
- The relationship of the new talks to the CSCE process, with the US insisting that the 23 states of both alliances work independently of the 35 CSCE states.

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Atlantic-to-the-Urals Zone
Equipment Summary



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START

Status of Talks

The US and USSR began negotiations on strategic weapons in Geneva in mid-1982. Currently, *negotiators are working on the basis of a joint draft treaty text* which incorporates respective US and Soviet positions on the specific arms to be reduced and on the procedures for implementing and verifying the reductions.

Areas of Agreement. Thus far, the two sides have agreed to:

- Reduce their *arsenals* so as not to exceed 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 6,000 weapons (explosive charges).
- Set *subceilings* within the 6,000-weapon limit so that no more than 4,900 warheads will be on land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and no more than 1,540 warheads will be on 154 "heavy" missiles.
- Count each *heavy bomber* as one strategic nuclear delivery vehicle and count each heavy bomber equipped for gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles as one warhead within the 6,000 limit.
- Reduce the *aggregate throw weight* of Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs to 50 percent below the existing level and set this level as a ceiling that neither party will exceed for the duration of the treaty.
- Adopt *verification procedures* that will provide for an extensive exchange of data, noninterference with national technical means of verification (NTMs), and the right to conduct on-site inspections.

Outstanding Issues

Mobile ICBMs. Though the US has not formally agreed that mobile missiles should be allowed under a START treaty, *the two sides have been discussing how to establish an effective regime for verifying limits* on such missiles. At the Moscow Summit a *US verification package was agreed to in principle* that would restrict road-mobile ICBMs to small restricted areas surrounding their garrisons, while providing for limited exercise and deployment rights, with appropriate notification, beyond these areas. Rail-mobile ICBMs would be permitted notified movements outside their garrison areas. General agreement was reached that a rigorous regime of on-site inspections of garrison facilities, and perimeter portal monitoring

of production facilities, would be necessary. At the latest round of START talks in Geneva, *the Soviets have tabled detailed proposals* to flesh out what was agreed to in principle at the summit.

Remaining areas of uncertainty include the size of restricted areas, the number of missiles or launchers that would be allowed to deploy simultaneously, and the exact production facilities subject to perimeter portal monitoring. Moscow has proposed placing the restricted areas for ground-mobile ICBMs within a larger deployment area, within which missiles could move for routine maintenance; the US is considering a more restrictive concept of deployment areas. The Soviets have not accepted a US proposal for tagging mobile missiles with unique identifiers in order to better monitor missile movements and numbers.

Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs). The *US and USSR are far apart on this issue*, which Moscow has characterized as one of the most important in the negotiations. In principle, the two sides have agreed to find a mutually satisfactory solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range nuclear-armed SLCMs. Both sides also agree that such limitations will be adopted outside the 6,000-warhead and 1,600-strategic offensive delivery system limits. *The Soviets, however, have offered proposals that would sharply limit planned US deployments of both nuclear and conventionally armed SLCMs and would involve extensive on-site inspections of submarines and surface vessels on both sides.* In response to US objections, the Soviets have insisted that a combination of on-site inspections and national technical means can effectively verify limits on SLCMs. [

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Soviet military planners believe unrestricted US deployment of nuclear-armed SLCMs would greatly complicate Soviet targeting plans, and could increase the US incentive to strike first in a crisis

Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). The sides agree to include long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs under START limits but differ over the range threshold for accountable ALCMs and over the counting rules for attributing a specific number of missiles to their respective ALCM-carrying aircraft:

- The US proposes that the limitations apply to nuclear-armed ALCMs with ranges of 1,500 km or greater; the Soviets would set the threshold at 600 km.
- The US also proposes that each ALCM-carrying heavy bomber be counted as carrying 10 ALCMs, while the Soviets maintain that bombers should be counted as carrying the number of ALCMs for which the aircraft is equipped.

From Moscow's perspective, the US proposal gives a disproportionate advantage to the US, since US heavy bombers can individually carry more ALCMs than their Soviet counterparts and the US has a larger bomber fleet. *The Soviets proposed this summer to drop a proposal they had made earlier for a sublimit of 1,100 on bomber-carried nuclear weapons, in return for counting conventionally armed heavy bombers toward the 1,600 limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. This is part of Soviet efforts to use START to constrain US plans to use conventionally armed heavy bombers in Europe.*

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Defense and Space Talks (D & S)

Status of Talks

Currently the Defense and Space talks are at a *standoff*. The US is attempting to get Soviet agreement to work a Joint Draft Treaty (JDT) text that clearly delineates agreed language and also provides the alternative language where there is no agreement. *The Soviets have agreed in concept to work a JDT but claim that the US is including additions that misrepresent the Washington Summit Joint Statement (WSJS) formula.* According to that formula: "... the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, [this is a Soviet formulation implying the 'narrow' interpretation of the treaty] while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time."

Outstanding Issues

Nonwithdrawal Period and Concomitant Rights. The basic Soviet goal in the D & S talks is to limit the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) by whatever means possible. As one way of delaying the implementation of the SDI program, the Soviets have insisted upon a blanket unconditional "nonwithdrawal clause" in the proposed D & S agreement that would bind the United States to the 1972 ABM Treaty for a specified period. The US position has been to insist on the rights as stipulated in international law relating to treaties, for example, the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty if extraordinary events jeopardize its supreme interests or the other party commits a material breach. The US has been willing to accept language pledging nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty on condition that its plans to develop and deploy SDI not be jeopardized; this has not been acceptable to the Soviets.

Right To Deploy SDI. In exchange for a nonwithdrawal clause, the US has insisted on having the right to deploy advanced strategic defenses, currently

prohibited by the ABM Treaty, *at the end of the nonwithdrawal period.* In the WSJS, it was mutually agreed that each party would be free to decide its course of action following the end of the nonwithdrawal period. The US states that the right to deploy is one of the "courses of action" open to the parties and therefore can be explicit in the agreement. However, *the Soviets have not accepted this position claiming that it runs counter to the ABM Treaty that is a treaty of unlimited duration.*

Sensors-Go-Free. This past year, the US officially presented a proposal to the Soviets that both sides agree to allow space-based sensors to be deployed irrespective of their capability. (The ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment in space of an ABM radar or a system capable of substituting for an ABM radar.) This proposal was made for a number of reasons. [

Thus far the Soviets have not provided a definitive position on the proposal

Test Range in Space. In the WSJS, the US insisted upon the phrase "... observe the ABM Treaty signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty." As a means of clarifying what it means by this phrase, the US proposed the concept of a "test range in space" as an extension of the permitted ground-based ABM test range. In its present form, the concept envisions no limits on orbital parameters but includes a number of specific restrictions relating to the testing procedures. [

It currently is on standby

Preparation of a Joint Draft Text (JDT). The negotiations in D & S are at the stage where a *Joint Draft Text of a treaty/agreement is in order*. The US has prepared such a document and provided it to the Soviets. *The Soviets have officially rejected the document on the grounds that the language is not consistent with the WSJS language.* They argued that the US side was attempting to subvert the meaning of the WSJS by limiting the nonwithdrawal commitment in a contrived effort to deploy strategic defenses; for example, "freedom to decide its own course of action" should not be construed as an unconditional right to deploy strategic defenses in the future. *They argue further that the Washington agreement confirms the limits of the ABM Treaty; in no way would the "broad interpretation" be acceptable.*

Linkage to START. The Soviets insist that there can be no 50-percent reduction in strategic forces until the US agrees to abide by the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. The US, on the other hand, stipulates that there can be no Defense and Space treaty until the Soviets have agreed to and signed a START treaty.

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Chemical Weapons Negotiations

The United States has been an active participant in *chemical weapons (CW) arms control efforts* for more than a decade. In 1981 these efforts shifted to the *40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD)* in Geneva. Bilateral discussions with the Soviets also have been held on the margins of the CD since 1986. *The primary US objective in the negotiations is to eliminate chemical weapons through a comprehensive and verifiable global ban.*

Negotiating Environment

The US is faced with the dilemma of finding a way to achieve its stated objective while recognizing that *there are severe difficulties in verifying a global CW ban* so as to protect the security of the US and its Allies. The negotiating environment also is complicated by a growing number of countries—now about 23—that may have acquired an offensive CW capability, and the breakdown of the international norm against CW use in the Iran-Iraq war.

Third World possession of chemical weapons complicates elimination of such weapons; those countries, particularly the poorer ones, that have made proportionately large investments in these weapons probably are unwilling to give them up and may not sign a treaty. Even if they do sign a treaty, many of these countries may decide to maintain their CW programs to counter enemies that might cheat on an agreement, particularly in light of the weak international response to CW use in the Iran-Iraq war.

Status of Talks

The US has come under increased pressure from the Soviets, many of the CD Western group,¹ and non-aligned nations for early completion of a treaty. The US has taken a deliberate approach at the CD in

¹ US, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Japan.

attempting to solve the complex issues that remain. *Recently the negotiations have included discussions on:*

- *Verification problems:*
 - How to monitor the civil chemical industries to ensure they are not producing chemical weapons/agents.
 - Schedule and procedures to ensure the destruction of chemical weapons and chemical production facilities.
 - Challenge inspection procedures to minimize the risk to sensitive facilities.
- *Structure, operation, staffing, and funding of an international body to implement treaty provisions.*
- *Data exchange and confidence building measures.*

In the initial phase of this data exchange, we believe that at least [] nations have issued false statements []

Prospects

The outcome of the chemical weapons negotiations will depend, in part, upon a political decision by the US on whether it is in the national interest to complete the drafting process for a CW treaty despite the inability to verify compliance

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Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT)

The bilateral Nuclear Testing Talks under way in Geneva since 1987 are intended to negotiate verification protocols to two treaties that were agreed to in the mid-1970s but not ratified by the US Senate.

Earlier Treaties

In 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) to prohibit nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (kt). Tests were limited to specific designated sites, and verification was limited to National Technical Means (NTM—predominantly teleseismic monitoring, that is, seismic measurements made at a distance greater than 2,775 km) and the exchange of data. In preparing the TTBT the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the need to establish an appropriate agreement to govern underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs). (There is no essential distinction between the technology of a nuclear explosive device that would be used as a weapon and the technology of a nuclear explosive device used for a peaceful purpose.) Negotiations began in the fall of 1974 and resulted in the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET) in April 1976.

The PNET prohibits single nuclear explosions having a yield exceeding 150 kt, group explosions having an aggregate yield exceeding 1,500 kt, and any group explosion exceeding 150 kt unless the individual explosions can be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The sides agreed to the use of on-site hydrodynamic monitoring for verification of group explosions above 150 kt, in order to confirm that no individual explosion exceeded 100 kt. This agreement was based on the fact that teleseismic means cannot distinguish among multiple explosions that occur simultaneously. The Soviets, however, have been concerned that the hydrodynamic method could reveal information beyond that needed to verify compliance. The treaty limited the presence of inspectors and equipment to monitoring group explosions having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kt.

Both treaties were submitted to the US Senate for advice and consent to ratification in July 1976. The Carter administration subsequently asked that

no action be taken on the treaties pending efforts to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Reagan administration did not seek ratification on the grounds that there were inadequate means to monitor compliance with these agreements

Recent Negotiating History

In 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin Nuclear Testing Talks (NTT) aimed at developing more precise means to monitor compliance with the TTBT and the PNET. (Round III of the talks began on 29 August 1988 and is expected to end some time in December 1988.) The United States insists that it should have the right to use a hydrodynamic measurement method (currently CORREX) to enhance verification of both the TTBT and the PNET. The Soviet Union, while not rejecting hydrodynamic measurement, holds that the two treaties can be effectively monitored by teleseismic measurement means alone. Soviet insistence on the effectiveness of teleseismic measurement stems in part from a desire to establish that such means are adequate to verify a comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests—one of Gorbachev's declared arms control priorities. The US position is that teleseismic means are not adequate to monitor either treaty.

PNET. During Round III all major issues have been decided for a new verification protocol to the PNET. Agreement in principle has been reached on the right to use a hydrodynamic yield measurement method for any explosion with a planned yield exceeding 50 kt, on the right to carry out on-site inspection of the test area for any explosion with a planned yield exceeding 35 kt, and on the right to make local seismic measurements for any group explosion with a planned aggregate yield exceeding 150 kt

Joint Verification Experiment and TTBT. During Round II of the NTT talks, the two parties agreed to conduct a Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) involving the detonation of a nuclear device by each country and the collection of yield measurements by both countries at the site of each test. On 17 August 1988, the United States exploded its device at the Nevada Test Site; on 14 September, the Soviet Union conducted its test at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test

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site. Each country conducted hydrodynamic and teleseismic yield measurements of both explosions. During the last week in October, experts from both countries met to discuss the results of the hydrodynamic measurements made by both countries at the site of each JVE test. *The Soviets probably hoped the JVE tests would discredit the hydrodynamic method, having consistently claimed that it is overly intrusive, too complex, impractical, and excessively expensive and that the teleseismic method of measurement is adequate to verify the TTBT. The Soviets have admitted at the experts meeting, however, that the results of the JVE tests demonstrate "advantages and disadvantages" for both methods.*

TTBT. Although US and Soviet drafts for a new verification protocol of the TTBT were prepared and exchanged during Round II, discussions were postponed until the results of the JVE tests were obtained.

Both the US and Soviet drafts call for the use of the hydrodynamic method for at least two tests a year. What is not agreed are the conditions under which hydrodynamic methods will be used. The United States is proposing that each side have the right to use the hydrodynamic method of measurement for each nuclear test with an expected yield greater than 50 kt or, if there are no tests planned for yields greater than 50 kt, the right to use the method for two tests with the highest planned yield in each calendar year. The Soviet Union is proposing the use of the hydrodynamic method for two nuclear tests with an expected yield greater than 100 kt. At issue also is the Soviet proposal calling for the use of joint seismic verification using five national teleseismic stations of each party for nuclear tests with expected yields greater than 75 kt.

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The ABM Treaty: Compliance or Conflict for the New Administration?

Moscow's immediate goal in strategic arms negotiations is to obtain a firm US commitment to an extended nonwithdrawal period from the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972—a step that they view as key to curtailing the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The Soviets have made it clear that they consider a US commitment to the treaty that places effective limits on SDI to be a prerequisite for any agreement to effect deep cuts in offensive systems under START.

Current Impasse Over Compliance

The US threat to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar a material breach has complicated Soviet efforts to preserve the ABM Treaty and move toward the completion of a START accord:

- The Krasnoyarsk issue has been on the agenda of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) since 1983, when US National Technical Means of verification first identified the facility as an illegally sited early warning radar under construction. Since that time *the US has demanded the complete and unconditional dismantlement of the radar as the only means of correcting the violation*
- *During the August 1988 ABM Treaty Review Conference in Geneva, the US Government formally reiterated the threat, made earlier in the year, that it would consider both declaring Krasnoyarsk to be a material breach of the treaty and taking appropriate and proportionate responses unless Moscow agreed to unconditional dismantlement of the radar.*
- *In September, Gorbachev went public with an offer to place the radar under international control as part of a center for the peaceful use of outer space in a move apparently intended to marshal enough domestic and international pressure on Washington to forestall the threatened US declaration.*
- Since late September, the Soviets have expressed interest in discussing ways in which the radar could be converted that would alleviate US concerns about its early warning capabilities while preserving the facility for space research

Through the end of the Reagan administration, the Soviets are likely to pursue simultaneously three approaches designed to cope with the range of actions that they perceive to be open to Washington:

- *Moscow will continue to press the United States to accept a compromise solution to the Krasnoyarsk issue that involves less than complete physical destruction of the radar and incorporates a specific US commitment to the ABM Treaty.*
- *Moscow, by continuing to project an image of interest in reasonable compromise and by offering proposals for what it describes as "mutually acceptable" solutions to compliance issues under discussion, will attempt to create an atmosphere that will preclude any US decision to issue a formal declaration of material breach.*
- *Moscow will lay out publicly Soviet argumentation about its compliance record, as well as allegations of US noncompliance, in an attempt to head off any formal US renunciation of the ABM Treaty should Washington proceed with the declaration of Krasnoyarsk as a material breach.*

Likely Future Course

Gorbachev probably believes that the chances for additional progress on core arms control issues are slight with the Reagan administration, but he almost certainly views a continuation of the negotiating process as the best course of action to lay the groundwork for dealing with the next administration. Gorbachev almost certainly will continue to play out his offer to internationalize and convert the Krasnoyarsk radar. We judge, however, that he would prefer to delay any dramatic new gesture until the move could be portrayed as a significant concession to solidify his personal relationship with the next president.

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Gorbachev clearly views the new administration as offering a fresh opportunity to break the impasse reached over compliance issues under the ABM Treaty and the conclusion of a START agreement:

- He seeks an extension of the treaty as a guarantee against being dragged into a full-scale technological competition with the US in SDI.
- He believes that an extension of the ABM Treaty, together with the reductions codified in a START treaty, would free his hand to pursue his highest priority economic goal, the modernization of the Soviet economy.

*We believe that Gorbachev would eventually agree to the complete dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk facility—as well as resolve other ABM compliance issues—in return for some form of US affirmation of the ABM Treaty. After criticism that he gave away too much in the INF agreement, however, Gorbachev almost certainly harbors reservations about the political risk of another apparent capitulation without a suitable US *quid pro quo*.*

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